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Abstract
The assumption that people possess a repertoire of strategies to solve the inference problems they face has been made
repeatedly. The experimental ﬁndings of two previous studies on strategy selection are reexamined from a learning
perspective, which argues that people learn to select strategies for making probabilistic inferences. This learning process
is modeled with the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that people develop subjective expectancies
for the strategies they have. They select strategies proportional to their expectancies, which are updated on the basis
of experience. For the study by Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003) it can be shown that people did not anticipate the
success of a strategy from the beginning of the experiment. Instead, the behavior observed at the end of the experiment
was the result of a learning process that can be described by the SSL theory. For the second study, by Bröder and
Schiffer (2006), the SSL theory is able to provide an explanation for why participants only slowly adapted to new
environments in a dynamic inference situation. The reanalysis of the previous studies illustrates the importance of
learning for probabilistic inferences.
Keywords: inferences, strategy selection, heuristics, learning theory, reinforcement learning, cognitive modeling.
1 Introduction
How do people make probabilistic inferences, such as in-
ferring the selling price of a car, the severity of an ill-
ness, or the likely winner of a tennis match? Differ-
ent strategies can be applied to make these inferences,
such as integrating all available information to predict
the criterion. In fact, many researchers have argued that
people are equipped with a repertoire of different cogni-
tive strategies for making judgments and decisions (e.g.,
Brown, 1995; Brown, Cui, & Gordon, 2002; Einhorn,
1970; Fishburn, 1980; Gigerenzer, Todd, & the ABC Re-
search Group, 1999; Ginossar & Trope, 1987; Payne,
1976; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988, 1993; Rapoport
& Wallsten, 1972; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999, 2008;
Svenson, 1979).
Do people apply different strategies for solving proba-
bilistic inferences? And if so, how do they select from
their strategy repertoire? The cost-beneﬁt approach to
strategy selection argues that people trade off the strate-
gies’ anticipated costs and beneﬁts. In contrast, I will
argue that selection is achieved via learning—that is, peo-
ple learn the success and failure of strategies through ex-
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perience and select a strategy based on past success. I
will describe a computational theory that speciﬁes this
learning process (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) and will use it
to explain people’s probabilistic inferences in two previ-
ous studies. The goal of this article is to demonstrate that
probabilistic inferences are strongly inﬂuenced by learn-
ing and that this learning process can be conceptualized
as learning to select strategies.
1.1 Cost-beneﬁt approach to strategy selec-
tion
The contingency model of Beach and Mitchell (1978)
conceptualizes the selection of strategies as a cost-beneﬁt
analysis. Each strategy is assumed to lead with a spe-
ciﬁc probability to a correct solution with a beneﬁcial
outcome, and with the remaining probability to an in-
correct solution with a less beneﬁcial or detrimental out-
come. Each strategy also involves some costs and it is
assumed that the probability of a correct solution is posi-
tively correlated with those costs. Subtracting a strategy’s
costs from its beneﬁts results in the net beneﬁt, and the
strategy with the maximum net beneﬁt is selected by the
decision maker.
Many authors have argued for such a cost-beneﬁt
approach to describe how strategies are selected (see
Christensen-Szalanski, 1978; Payne et al., 1988, 1993;
Smith & Walker, 1993). Yet despite being conceptually
straightforward, the approach has not been spelled out as
a computational model that deﬁnes how the trade-off pro-
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cess is cognitively determined. The ﬁrst obvious barrier
to a computational description consists in the fact that
severalbeneﬁts(e.g., monetarygains, accuracy)andcosts
(e.g., cognitive effort, time) can be distinguished, yet they
have to be mapped onto one single scale. Second, it is
not clear which strategy is applied to evaluate the costs
and beneﬁts, nor how this strategy is selected, potentially
leading to an inﬁnite regress problem of strategy selec-
tion.
1.2 Learning approach to strategy selection
Rieskamp and Otto (2006, see also Rieskamp, 2006a)
took an alternative, bottom-up approach to strategy selec-
tion that is based on learning. They proposed the strategy
selection learning (SSL) theory, which assumes that peo-
ple most likely select the strategy that they expect to be
most successful in solving an inference problem. How-
ever, instead of assuming that people deliberately trade
off strategies’ costs and beneﬁts, the theory states that the
strategies’ expectancies are the result of a learning pro-
cess. When facing a decision situation for the ﬁrst time,
people have initial expectancies for each strategy they
might use, based on past experience with similar deci-
sion situations. These expectancies are updated depend-
ing on whether the selected strategy succeeds or fails to
solve the decision problem. On the basis of this learn-
ing process the theory predicts that after sufﬁcient expe-
rience an individual is most likely to select the strategy
that performs best in a speciﬁc environment. Consistent
with this basic assumption of the SSL theory, previous
research has provided substantial empirical evidence that
depending on the statistical properties of environments,
different cognitive models are best at predicting people’s
behavior, in particular when substantial outcome feed-
back is provided (e.g., Bröder, 2003; Garcia-Retamero,
& Rieskamp, in press; von Helversen & Rieskamp, 2008;
Rieskamp, 2006a). It should be emphasized, however,
that the cognitive strategies people are “selecting” are un-
observable and can only be inferred from the observed
behavior, such as information search or the ﬁnal choices.
Thus, when a strategy is capable of predicting a person’s
information search and ﬁnal choices, this can be inter-
preted as indicating the person had selected the strategy.
However, this is always just an interpretation and alterna-
tively cognitive models that do not assume any cognitive
strategies could provide a better account of the inference
process. Hence, when herein participants’ cognitive pro-
cesses are described, for simplicity, as selecting speciﬁc
strategies, this is always just an interpretation of a strat-
egy’s good ﬁt in describing the observed behavior.
Although the SSL theory follows a bottom-up ap-
proach to strategy selection, it is not necessarily to be
seen in opposition to the cost-beneﬁt approach. The
trade-off process assumed by the cost-beneﬁt approach
could inﬂuence the initial preferences for speciﬁc strate-
gies assumed by the SSL theory. However, the SSL the-
ory argues that individuals’ initial preferences for spe-
ciﬁc strategies are wiped out by the strategies’ success
or failure when repeatedly applied, so that over time the
selected strategy for a decision problem is a function of
the strategies’ success. Proponents of the cost-beneﬁt
approach have also suggested that the selection process
could be triggered by learning (Payne et al., 1993).
The learning approach predicts that the probability
with which a speciﬁc strategy is selected for a decision
problem will change over time when outcome feedback
is provided. In particular, when an individual initially
selects an unsuccessful strategy, the individual should
switch to another more successful strategy during the
course of learning. I will call this the learning prediction,
and it implies that in a repeated decision-making situa-
tion, the strategy that most successfully predicts the ma-
jority of a person’s decisions might not be the only strat-
egy this person has applied during the course of learning.
Instead, it may be that only after some time did a prefer-
ence for a speciﬁc strategy develop. Therefore according
to the learning approach, which strategy will predict the
majority of inferences strongly depends on the speed of
learning and the provided learning opportunities. When
people change the strategies they select on the basis of
learning, then these learning processes need to be taken
into account in any accurate description of the cognitive
processes underlying inferences.
1.3 The SSL theory
In the following, the SSL theory is described in more de-
tail. Individuals have a set S of N cognitive strategies. An
individual’s preference for a particular cognitive strategy
i is expressed by positive expectancies qt(i), so that the
probability of selecting strategy i at trial t is deﬁned by
pt(i) =
qt(i)
PN
j=1 qt(j)
(1)
with j as an index for the cognitive strategies. The strate-
gies’ expectancies in the ﬁrst period of the task can differ
and are deﬁned by
q1(i) = rcorrect · w · βi (2)
where rcorrect is the payoff received for a correct decision,
w is the initial association parameter, and β is the initial
preference parameter. The payoff rcorrect received for a
correct decision in a particular task is a scaling constant
that allows comparisons across tasks with different pay-
offs. The initial association parameter w is restricted to
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with the available strategies relative to later reinforce-
ment, and thus it essentially describes the learning rate.
The theory assumes that individuals have initial prefer-
ences for selecting particular strategies at the beginning
of a task. The initial preference parameter βi for each
strategy i is restricted to 0 < β < 1 and
PN
i=1 βi = 1.
After a decision is made, the strategies’ expectancies are
updated by
qt(i) = qt−1(i) + It−1(i)rt−1(i) (3)
where It−1(i) is an indicator function and rt−1(i) is the
reinforcement. The reinforcement of a strategy is deﬁned
as the payoffrt−1(i) that the strategy produced. The indi-
cator function It−1(i) equals 1 if strategy i was selected
and equals 0 if the strategy was not selected. For the fol-
lowing two studies it is assumed that a strategy was se-
lected if the choice coincides with the strategy’s predic-
tion. When two or more strategies make the same pre-
diction that coincides with the individual’s choice, it is
assumed that It−1(i) equals the probability with which
the model predicts the selection of these strategies. By
deﬁnition, if qt(i) falls below a minimum value ρ due to
negative payoffs, qt(i) is set to ρ; for the following stud-
ies ρ = 0.0001 was used.
Finally, the SSL theory assumes that people make er-
rors when applying a strategy, so that, by mistake, they
deviate from the strategy’s prediction. Let p(a|i) denote
the probability of choosing alternative a out of the set of
alternatives when strategy i is selected, so that the prob-
ability of choosing alternative a given strategy i and an
application error ε is
pt(a|i,ε) = (1 − ε) · pt(a|i) +
ε
k − 1
· pt(¯ a|i) (4)
where pt(¯ a|i,ε) denotes the probability of choosing any
other alternative than a from the available k alternatives,
given strategy i was selected. For simplicity, the applica-
tion error is assumed to be the same across strategies (for
psychologically more plausible error concepts see Mata,
Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007; Rieskamp, Busemeyer, &
Mellers, 2006). The probability of choosing alternative
a depends on the probabilities of selecting the strategies
and the corresponding choice probabilities of the strate-
gies, so that
pt(a) =
N X
i=1
pt(i) · pt(a|i,ε) (5)
The SSL theory is similar to other recent learning mod-
els that assume a learning process of strategy selection
(see Busemeyer & Myung, 1992; Erev & Barron, 2005;
Siegler & Shipley, 1995; Stahl, 1996). These “cousins”
differ from the SSL theory in the exact learning mecha-
nisms they assume.
2 Study 1: Learning in Stable Envi-
ronments
The ﬁrst study that I have reanalyzed was conducted by
Newell, Weston, and Shanks (2003). The authors stud-
ied the problem of inferring which of two objects had a
higher criterion value on the basis of several cues. For
this inference problem Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996)
proposed a simple lexicographic heuristic called Take
The Best (TTB), which only considers the most valid
cue for making an inference; if this cue does not dis-
criminate the second most valid cue is considered, and
so on. Gigerenzer and Goldstein illustrated through com-
puter simulation that the heuristic performs as well as
and sometimes even better than more complex alterna-
tive strategies, among them a weighted additive strategy
(WADD). The WADD strategy computes a score for each
alternative by taking the sum of the cue values multiplied
by the cues’ validities and ﬁnally selects the alternative
with the largest sum.
Newell et al. argued that despite the psychological
plausibility of simple heuristics it is necessary to demon-
strate “that people do indeed use these heuristics in
the environments in which they are claimed to operate”
(2003, p. 83). For the empirical test of the heuristic they
conducted two experiments, of which I have reconsidered
the ﬁrst one. In this experiment, the information search
preceding participants’ inferences led to high monetary
costs. Due to these high costs it should have been obvi-
ous from the beginning of the experiment that a strategy
that requires a lot of information would perform badly.
Therefore when following the cost-beneﬁt approach to
strategy selection, participants should have selected an
information-frugal strategy right from the beginning of
the experiment. In contrast, a learning approach predicts
that a well-performing strategy that requires little infor-
mation will be selected more frequently after gaining ex-
perience with the inference problem.
2.1 Procedure
Newell et al.’s (2003) participants repeatedly had to in-
fer which stock shares of a company would perform most
proﬁtably in the future. Each share was described by six
dichotomous cues, with validities of the cues ranging be-
tween .65 and .90. With six dichotomous cue values for
six cues, 64 different cue proﬁles result, leading to 2,016
possible pair comparisons, of which 180 were selected
randomly for each participant. The information of the
cues could be acquired with a cost of 1 pence (U.K.) for
each cue. After the participants made an inference they
received feedback on whether their decision was correct
and earned 7 pence for each correct decision. The par-
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lidities. However, to facilitate learning the objective cue
validities, after 60 and 120 trials the rank order of the
cues according to the validities was provided to the par-
ticipants.
The imposed information search cost of 1 pence for
each cue was very high relative to the gain of 7 pence
for a correct inference. A random choice strategy with
no search costs would have led to an expected gain of
3.5 pence. Thus, by acquiring all available information
it was in principle not possible to outperform the ran-
dom choice strategy, even when the acquired informa-
tion enabled 100% accuracy leading to a payoff of only
1 pence. This clearly illustrates that if participants antic-
ipated the strategies’ costs and beneﬁts from the begin-
ningoftheexperimentaspredictedbythecost-beneﬁtap-
proach, they should have selected an information-frugal
strategy right from the beginning.
2.2 Results
Newell et al. (2003) stated that participants’ inferences
were inﬂuenced by a learning process, so that they only
examined the last third of the experiment to infer the
strategies participants selected. To classify participants’
inference strategies, Newell et al. looked at participants’
search behavior and their ﬁnal choices. The authors re-
ported that at the end of the experiment the vast majority
of participants searched for the cues in the order of their
validities, in particular acquiring the most valid cue ﬁrst.
This search behavior is consistent with TTB, but even for
a strategy such as WADD, search according to the cues’
validities is plausible. Due to the high search costs, it
is reasonable to assume that participants with a prefer-
ence for WADD would try to restrict their search. This
can be achieved by comparing the alternatives cue-wise,
determining the difference of the cue values weighted by
the cues’ validities, and updating the difference with each
new cue considered. Search stops whenever the present
difference cannot be reversed by the outstanding cues not
consideredyet. WiththisimplementationofWADD,cues
would also be searched according to their validity, so that
search behavior does not allow unambiguous identiﬁca-
tion of selected strategies.
For this reason it is more revealing to look at when
participants stopped their information search (see also
Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007). One third of the partic-
ipants stopped search in a manner consistent with TTB,
that is, they always stopped search after they found a dis-
criminating cue. All other participants stopped their in-
formation search in 70% of all inferences after they found
the ﬁrst discriminating cue. In addition to looking at par-
ticipants’ information search, Newell et al. (2003) also
considered whether TTB could predict people’s choices.
For 50% of the participants, TTB predicted their choices
perfectly, whereas for the remaining 50% TTB could still
predict on average 80% of the choices. In sum, Newell
et al. concluded that 11 of the 24 participants most likely
selected TTB, whereas 9 participants used a “weight of
evidence” strategy, such as WADD.
2.3 Reanalysis: Estimating the SSL the-
ory’s parameters
Newell et al. (2003) reported that the participants im-
proved their inferences over time. Because they found
substantial learning effects, they focused their analysis
on the behavior at the end of the experiment. Could the
strategies the participants selected at the end of the exper-
iment be the result of a learning process, and could this
learning process be described by the SSL theory? To an-
swer this question I reanalyzed participants’ behavior for
the whole experiment. The parameters of the SSL theory
were estimated separately for each individual’s learning
data as follows: The model predicted the probability with
which a participant would choose each of the available
alternatives for each trial conditioned on past choices and
feedback. As a goodness-of-ﬁt criterion, the G2 mea-
surement was used (Burnham & Anderson, 1998), de-
ﬁned in Equation 6, for which the likelihood function
f(y|θ,t − 1) denotes the probability of choice y in trial
t given the model’s parameter set θ and all information
from the preceding trial t − 1:
G2 = −2 ·
t X
t=1
ln(f(y|θ,t − 1)) (6)
The parameter values that minimized G2 were searched
for; the initial association parameter was restricted to 1
≤w≤100.
Three parameters were estimated, resulting in an aver-
age estimated association parameter value of 18. The as-
sociation parameter determines the strategies’ initial ex-
pectancies, and the larger the value the more time it will
take to develop a preference for another strategy. A value
of 18 implies that the payoff for a correct decision of 7
pence is multiplied by 18, and this “stock of association”
is then divided between the two strategies the decision
maker considers (cf. Equation 2). Thus, if the decision
maker showed a strong preference for one strategy by,
for instance, dividing up the stock with a ratio of 15 to 3,
then this decision maker would need to apply the less-
preferred strategy successfully at least 12 times to de-
velop an equal preference for both strategies.
In fact, the initial preferences were not that different.
The average estimated initial preference parameter was
βTTB = .41 for TTB, implying an initial preference of
βWADD = 1 - βTTB = .59 for the WADD strategy. Thus,
on average, the decision makers had a slight preferenceJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 265
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Figure 1: The proportion of choices predicted by Take The Best (TTB) and a weighted additive strategy (W ADD)
in the ﬁrst experimental study by Newell et al. (2003). Also shown is the strategy selection learning (SSL) theory’s
predicted probability of selecting the two strategies. Only discriminating trials where the strategies make different
predictions are shown, and each trial block consists of 30 trials.
to integrate the available information at the beginning of
the experiment. This result is surprising if a cost-beneﬁt
approach to strategy selection is being followed: If partic-
ipants were considering the high search costs right from
the beginning of the experiment they should have pre-
ferred a strategy of focusing on single cues from the
beginning. However, there were large individual differ-
ences: Although for the majority of participants ( n = 14)
an initial preference for WADD was found (i.e., βWADD
> .50), for a substantial number of participants (n = 10)
an initial preference for TTB was indeed estimated (i.e.,
βTTB > .50).
The third parameter estimated was the application er-
ror, for which an average value of .18 resulted, which is
relatively high in comparison to average application er-
rors ranging between .05 and .07 estimated across several
experiments by Rieskamp and Otto (2006). A high ap-
plication error implies, according to the SSL theory, that
the participants often deviated from their strategies. For
the experiment of Newell et al. (2003) these deviations
can be easily explained by the cue validities that are re-
quired by the strategies. To determine the SSL theory’s
prediction, I used the objective cue validities. However,
this is, of course, only an approximation, because the par-
ticipants had to learn the validities during the experiment
and only hints about the rank order of the validities were
provided. Thus, when the subjective cue validities differ
from the objective cue validities this can easily explain
why a participant selecting TTB would frequently devi-
ate from the prediction of TTB using the objective cue
validities. Yet for only four participants was a relatively
high application error larger than .30 estimated. These
participantsapparentlymadetheirinferencesmoreorless
randomly. Newell et al. also concluded from participants’
search behavior that four participants made their infer-
ences randomly, and consistently for the SSL theory high
application errors were estimated for three of these same
four participants.
How well did the SSL theory describe participants’ in-
ferences? The SSL theory was able to predict partici-
pants’ choices with an average probability of .71 (with
SD = 0.05), which is slightly lower than, for instance, that
foundinthesimilarstudiesbyRieskampandOtto(2006),
where the choices were predicted with average probabil-
ities of .74, .75, and .79. More interesting is whether
the SSL theory can also describe the adaptive selection
of cognitive strategies. The percentage of choices pre-
dicted by TTB and WADD, respectively, can be taken as
an approximation of participants’ strategy selections and
can be compared to the probability with which the SSL
theory predicts this selection per trial block.
Figure 1 shows the percentage of inferences that are
predicted by TTB and by WADD, restricted to those trials
where the strategies make different predictions. In addi-
tion, the ﬁgure shows the SSL theory’s predicted proba-
bilities of selecting TTB and WADD. Newell et al. (2003)
provided feedback starting with the very ﬁrst inference,
so that participants’ initial strategy preferences could not
be shown. The ﬁts of the strategies in the ﬁrst trial block
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additionally shows the initial probability with which the
SSL theory predicts the selection of the strategy at the be-
ginning of the experiment before any inference has been
made (i.e., trial block 0).
Overall, the SSL theory’s predicted probabilities of se-
lecting the two strategies nicely matched the proportion
of predicted inferences by the two strategies. Only at
the beginning of the experiment does the SSL theory de-
scribe a faster learning process than is actually observed;
that is, the probability of selecting TTB is larger than
one would infer from the percentage of inferences pre-
dicted by TTB. This is presumably because the SSL the-
ory makes use of the objective cue validities that had to
be learned. The process of learning the validities appar-
ently slowed down the process of learning to select an
adaptive strategy. However, after the second trial block
participants were familiar with the objective rank order
of the cues’ validities and the strongest learning process
was observed, for which the SSL theory provides a good
account.
2.4 Discussion
The reanalysis of the data of Newell et al. (2003) illus-
trates two points: First, the cost-beneﬁt approach to strat-
egy selection does not easily explain the experimental
ﬁndings when assuming that people anticipate strategies’
costs and beneﬁts when encountering an inference prob-
lem. Second, the selection of strategies is strongly inﬂu-
enced by a learning process.
Duetohighsearchcosts, thecost-beneﬁtapproachpre-
dicts that participants will favor strategies that rely on lit-
tle information. Contrary to this prediction, at the be-
ginning of the experiment the WADD strategy, which re-
quires a lot of information, predicted participants’ infer-
ences best. Thus, apparently people did not select a well-
performing strategy from the beginning. Instead, the se-
lection of strategies appears to have been strongly inﬂu-
enced by a learning process, so that only at the end of
the experiment was the most appropriate strategy for the
problem (i.e., TTB), on average, the best strategy for pre-
dicting participants’ inferences.
The SSL theory was suitable to describe the observed
learning process. However, because no subjective validi-
ties were elicited in the study by Newell et al. (2003), the
predictions of the SSL theory were based on the objective
cue validities. To the extent that these objective validities
do not correspond to the subjective ones, the SSL theory
willhavetroublepredictingthe inferences. Overall, when
analyzing the data of the whole experiment, it becomes
clear that the behavior observed at the end of the exper-
iment — on which Newell et al. based their conclusions
— was strongly inﬂuenced by a learning process that can
be accurately described with the SSL theory.
3 Study 2: Learning in dynamic en-
vironments
The experimental results of Newell et al. (2003) illustrate
that people do quite well in adapting their inference pro-
cesses to the inference situation. Although some partici-
pants did search for too much information, incurring high
costs for search, the majority made their inferences in ac-
cordance with simple inference processes that were most
suitable for the high-search-costs situation. The reanaly-
sis shows that the adaptive behavior Newellet al. reported
for the end of the experiment is the result of a learning
process that can be described by the SSL theory.
Do people also accurately adapt their inference pro-
cess in a dynamic inference situation in which the best-
performing strategy changes over time? This question
was addressed in a study by Bröder and Schiffer (2006).
In the ﬁrst half of their experiment participants encoun-
tered either an environment in which it was best to focus
on single pieces of information (i.e., TTB led to a better
performance than WADD) or an environment in which
WADD outperformed TTB. Thus, the central question
was whether the participants would select the most adap-
tive strategy according to the environment. Moreover, for
half of the participants the environment changed after the
ﬁrst half of the experiment, that is, they were confronted
with a second, not previously encountered environment.
Would the participants also be able to adapt to the new
environment?
3.1 Procedure
In the ﬁrst of Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) experiments
the participants had to infer which of three companies’
shares of stock would perform most proﬁtably in the
future. The experiment had two phases with 80 infer-
ences each. The participants encountered either a com-
pensatory or a noncompensatory environment in the ﬁrst
phase, in which WADD or TTB performed best, respec-
tively. Thereafter, for half of the participants the environ-
ment was changed so that the environment they had not
previously encountered was used for the second phase
(and half of the participants for whom the environment
changed got a hint that the environment had changed).
The payoff that each share produced was a function of
the four cues and the amount of information the partici-
pants acquired (each acquired cue value led to a reduction
of the ﬁnal gain of 4%). The three shares led to a speciﬁc
payoff and in principle all shares could lead to a similar
positive payoff. Thus, whereas in the study by Newell
et al. (2003) there was one single correct choice with a
gain, in the study by Bröder and Schiffer the options led
to diverse outcomes and these were presented to the par-
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important, because it deﬁnes the task’s incentive structure
and the feedback that induces a learning process. Ac-
cording to the SSL theory, a strategy’s reinforcement is
deﬁned by the monetary gains it produces. Therefore, if
TTB and WADD lead to different choices, but the payoffs
attached to these choices do not differ substantially, then
this would not induce a strong learning effect in compar-
ison to a learning situation in which only one choice is
rewarded.
As in the study of Newell et al. (2003), the participants
had to learn the importance of the cues and no cue va-
lidities were provided. This is important because again
the strategies’ ﬁts in predicting participants’ inferences
were based on the objective cue validities. This implies
that a low ﬁt of TTB could mean either that the strat-
egy was not selected at all or that the strategy was ap-
plied differently by using different subjective cue validi-
ties. To determine the ﬁt of the compensatory strategy
WADD Bröder and Schiffer (2006) assumed that the rank
order of WADD’s weights would correspond to the rank
order of the objective validities. Furthermore, three dif-
ferent variants of WADD were examined, with different
weighting schemes for the weights of the cues, and the
variant with the highest ﬁt was assigned to the partici-
pants. Naturally, this implies that the participants had a
prioriahigherchanceofbeingclassiﬁedasusingWADD.
To avoid this a priori advantage, in the following reanaly-
sis I only used one single weighting schema to determine
WADD’s predictions. I selected the schema according to
which any two less important cues were always sufﬁcient
to compensate for the information of one, more important
cue. Moreover, I did not include a compensatory strategy
that gave equal weight to each cue as Bröder and Schiffer
did. Thus, I used only one compensatory and one non-
compensatory strategy to reanalyze the data.
3.2 Results and discussion
Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) data were reanalyzed by
classifying each participant as using either TTB or
WADD.1 For the ﬁrst phase of the experiment a strong ef-
fect of the environment on the strategy classiﬁcation was
observed.
1Classiﬁcation was performed on the basis of the quadratic scoring
rule (Selten, 1998), according to which a strategy i with application er-
ror ε reaches a ﬁt QS of
QS(i,ε) = 1/T
PT
t=1
P3
k=1[Dt(k) − pt(k|i,ε)]2,
with t for the trial, t as the number of trials, and k for the three alterna-
tives; pt(k|i,ε) denotes the probability of choosing alternative k when
using strategy i (see Equation 4), and Dt(k) is an indicator function that
equals 1 if alternative k was chosen and equals 0 if the alternative was
not chosen. For each strategy and participant the optimum value for the
application error ε was selected that led to the lowest, that is, the best
value for QS. Participants were assigned to the strategy with the lowest
QS value and were left unclassiﬁed if both strategies reached the same
ﬁt.
For the noncompensatory environment the majority of
participants (79%) were classiﬁed as using the noncom-
pensatory TTB heuristic, whereas in the compensatory
environment 58% of the participants were classiﬁed as
using the compensatory strategy WADD (ignoring three
unclassiﬁed participants across all conditions). Thus, the
participants reacted sensitively and adaptively to the two
environments.
What happened in the second phase of the experiment?
For those participants who continued with the same envi-
ronment, results were similar to those in the ﬁrst phase
of the experiment; that is, 77% of the participants were
classiﬁed as using TTB in the noncompensatory environ-
ment and 70% were classiﬁed as using a compensatory
strategy in the compensatory environment. Thus, partic-
ipants apparently just continued to make their inferences
in the same way as they had in the ﬁrst half of the exper-
iment, and in the compensatory environment participants
apparently selected WADD more frequently.
Most interesting is what happened when the partici-
pants encountered a new environment. Did they adap-
tively switch their strategy? An adaptive switch was only
partly observed: Only 27% of the participants who en-
countered the compensatory environment in the second
phase after seeing the noncompensatory environment in
the ﬁrst phase were classiﬁed as using a compensatory
strategy. Thus, apparently the participants only slowly
adapted to the new environments. However, 65% of the
participants who encountered the noncompensatory en-
vironment in the second phase after seeing the compen-
satory environment in the ﬁrst phase were indeed classi-
ﬁed as using the better performing TTB strategy.
These results are somewhat different from the results
reported by Bröder and Schiffer (2006), because in their
analysis three additional compensatory strategies were
included. Accordingly more participants were classi-
ﬁed as using a compensatory strategy and fewer as us-
ing the noncompensatory strategy TTB, and in partic-
ular a switch to TTB was not observed when partici-
pants encountered the noncompensatory environment af-
ter the compensatory environment. It is an open question
whether Bröder and Schiffer classiﬁed more participants
as using a compensatory strategy because they simply
examined more compensatory strategies, or whether the
participants indeed used different types of compensatory
strategies. However, this question is not of particular im-
portance for the present article.
3.2.1 Describing the learning process with the SSL
theory
Bröder and Schiffer (2006) described the lack of adap-
tivity in the second phase of the experiment as a routine
effect; that is, they assumed that the strategies the par-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 268
ticipants selected in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment be-
came routines, so that when the environment changed the
participants stuck to their routines. To explain why par-
ticipants in the second phase did not switch to another
strategy they referred to a dual-system theory of deci-
sion making (e.g., Betsch, 2005; Evans & Over, 1996;
Sloman, 1996). According to the dual-system approach,
people can be in either of two cognitive modes when
making decisions, a deliberative, top-down mode or an
associative, experienced-based, bottom-up mode. Bröder
and Schiffer argued that when participants encountered a
noveldecisionsituationtheywereinatop-downmodefor
“calculations of long-term payoff advantages” that led to
the selection of an adaptive strategy. Thus, the top-down
mode refers to the cost-beneﬁt approach, which should
lead to the selection of the best-performing strategy in
an environment. In contrast, after participants selected a
successful strategy they “switched to a bottom-up mode
by routinely applying this strategy, which avoids testing
the consequences in each trial” (p. 915). However, nei-
ther proponents of the two-system approach nor Bröder
and Schiffer provided a computational model that speci-
ﬁes how these two modes of cognition are activated, de-
termines how and whether they interact, and describes the
observed learning processes.
In the following I will show how the SSL theory ex-
plains the results. Bröder and Schiffer (2006) also re-
ferred to the SSL theory as a potential description of the
bottom-up mode of strategy selection. I will show with
the reanalysis that the SSL theory is able to describe the
learning process not only for the second half of the ex-
periment but also for the whole experiment by assuming
a learning process of strategy selection. Thus, instead of
postulating a dual-system theory of decision making, I
can illustrate that a single “cognitive mode” of learning
is sufﬁcient to explain the experimental ﬁndings. I will
argue that the SSL theory provides a more parsimonious
explanation of the maladaptive selection of strategies de-
scribed by Bröder and Schiffer than the dual-system ap-
proach does.
The parameters of the SSL theory were estimated sep-
arately for each individual’s learning data as follows: The
model predicted the probability with which a participant
would choose each of the available alternatives for each
trial conditioned on past choices and feedback (using
maximum likelihood as a goodness-of-ﬁt criterion, cf.
Equation 6). The predictions of TTB and WADD were
determined on the basis of the objective weights of the
cues as described above. For the SSL theory three param-
eterswereestimated, resultinginanaverageestimatedas-
sociation parameter value of 36; this is similar to values
estimatedinRieskampandOtto(2006). Theaverageesti-
mated initial preference parameter was βTTB = .61 for for
TTB, implying an initial preference of βWADD = 1 - βTTB
= .39 for WADD. Thus, on average, the participants had
an initial preference for TTB. This is surprising consider-
ing that in similar studies an initial preference for WADD
has often been observed. One explanation might be the
high search costs. In Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) study
the participants had to pay 4% of their potential gain for
every single cue value, meaning that if they searched for
all the information their gain was reduced by 48%. This
procedure might have made it more salient that a strategy
that requires a lot of information cannot perform well,
leading to an initial preference for TTB.
The third parameter estimated was the application er-
ror, for which an average value of .26 resulted. This
value is relatively high in comparison to the results of
Rieskamp and Otto (2006), with average application er-
rors ranging between .05 and .07 across several exper-
iments. A high application error according to the SSL
theory implies that the participants often deviated from
their selected strategies. For Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006)
experiment this high value can be explained by the sub-
jective importance the participants gave to the cues. To
determine the predictions of the strategies one particular
compensatory weighting schema was employed. How-
ever, this is only an approximation and the participants
might have given rather different subjective importance
to the cues. If the subjective importance differed from the
objective weights it is not surprising that TTB or WADD
relying on the objective weights do not predict all infer-
ences, which is reﬂected in a high application error. Note,
however, that the SSL theory does not require that people
learnspeciﬁcweights; itwouldonlybepreferabletoelicit
the subjective importance of the cues, so that the strate-
gies’predictions are determined on the basisof subjective
importance.
How well did the SSL theory describe participants’ in-
ferences? The SSL theory was able to predict partici-
pants’choiceswithanaverageprobabilityof.58(withSD
= 0.05), which is much larger than the .33 one would pre-
dict by random chance. Nevertheless, it is lower than the
average predicted probability of .75 found in Rieskamp
and Otto’s (2006) experiment, which also examined a
three-alternative inference problem. The lower ﬁt is pre-
sumably due to the employed weights for the cues that
only partly correspond with the subjective importance the
participants gave to the cues.
Can the SSL theory also describe the adaptive selec-
tion of cognitive strategies? Figure 2 shows for the two
stable environments the percentage of choices predicted
by TTB and WADD across eight trial blocks of 20 tri-
als each, restricted to those trials where the two strate-
gies make different predictions. Additionally, the ﬁgure
shows with what probability the SSL theory predicts the
selection of TTB and WADD. Figure 2A shows the re-
sults for the participants only facing a noncompensatoryJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 269
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trial blocks
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
/
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
TTB
WADD
p(TTB I SSL Theory)
p(WADD I SSL Theory)
Noncompensatory - noncompensatory  environment
A
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Trial blocks
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
P
r
o
p
o
r
t
i
o
n
 
/
 
P
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
TTB
WADD
p(TTB I SSL Theory)
p(WADD I SSL Theory)
Compensatory - compensatory environment
B
Figure 2: The proportion of choices predicted by TTB and WADD in the stable noncompensatory (A) and stable
compensatory (B) environment conditions of the ﬁrst experimental study of Bröder and Schiffer (2006). Also shown
is the SSL theory’s predicted probability of selecting the two strategies. Only discriminating trials where the strategies
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environment and illustrates a strong learning effect: The
proportion of choices that could be best predicted by TTB
steadily increases across the eight blocks of trials. This
learning effect explains why the majority of participants
were classiﬁed as using TTB in both halves of the exper-
iment.
A corresponding learning effect was observed for the
compensatory environment (Figure 2B). Here, in the ﬁrst
two trial blocks TTB predicted more inferences than
WADD, but due to learning, the percentage of inferences
predicted by WADD increased so that in the second half
it predicted the majority of inferences. This learning ef-
fect can explain why most participants were classiﬁed as
using WADD in the second half of the experiment. The
compensatory environment also illustrates that the par-
ticipants did not select the most adaptive strategy right
from the beginning, as a cost-beneﬁt approach predicts.
Instead, a preference for WADD was developed through
the ﬁrst 80 choices. The probabilities with which the SSL
theory predicts the selection of TTB or WADD nicely
match the proportion of inferences predicted by the two
strategies. These results suggest that people do not ini-
tially select a strategy for an environment and keep using
it without monitoring its success, as suggested by Bröder
and Schiffer (2006, see p. 915). Instead people’s initial
preferences for a speciﬁc strategy are quickly wiped out
by the experiences they have, so that the strategy they se-
lect for a speciﬁc environment is essentially the result of
the strategies’ success.
3.2.2 Describing behavior in dynamic environments
with the SSL theory
But do people also learn to adapt to dynamic environ-
ments? Figure 3 shows for the dynamic environments the
percentage of choices predicted by TTB and WADD. Fig-
ure 3A shows the results for the experimental condition
starting with the noncompensatory environment and con-
tinuing with the compensatory environment. For the ﬁrst
half of the experiment a learning process is observed with
an increasing proportion of inferences predicted by TTB.
After the shift of the environment in the ﬁfth trial block
the percentage of inferences predicted by TTB decreases
only slowly. In the seventh trial block a larger decrease
can be observed. Nevertheless, across all trial blocks in
the second phase of the experiment when participants en-
countered the compensatory environment TTB did much
better than WADD in predicting the inferences. Can this
maladaptive behavior be described by the SSL theory?
The SSL theory predicts an even slower adaptation
process to the new environment, for two reasons: First,
when TTB is selected with a high probability a person
will only rarely select the competing compensatory strat-
egy and will therefore only rarely experience its better
performance compared to TTB. Second, as a result of the
ﬁrst phase of the experiment, the strategies’ expectancies,
in particular TTB’s expectancies, have grown substan-
tially, so that it will take a considerable number of trials
with positive reinforcement for WADD’s expectancies to
exceed TTB’s expectancies again.
Figure 3B shows the results for the condition starting
with the compensatory environment and continuing with
the noncompensatory environment. Here, the results are
less clear. In the ﬁrst half of the experiment the percent-
age of inferences that could be best predicted by WADD,
the better performing strategy in the compensatory envi-
ronment, increased across the ﬁrst four trial blocks, so
that in the third and fourth trial block it predicted more
inferences than TTB. In the second half of the experi-
ment the percentage of inferences predicted by WADD
decreased with a corresponding increase of the inferences
predicted by TTB, so that TTB did better in the last three
trial blocks. Thus, the proportion of predicted inferences
by WADD and TTB changed adaptively depending on the
environment. However, the differences are rather small
and less conclusive, considering that the proportion of
inferences predicted by TTB or WADD varies between
approximately 40 and 55%. Nevertheless, the SSL the-
ory describes this learning process by an increasing prob-
ability with which WADD is selected in the ﬁrst half
of the experiment, followed by a decreasing probability
in the second half. Thus, the SSL theory can also ex-
plain when an adaptation to a new environment occurred,
for instance, when previous experience did not lead to a
strong preference for a speciﬁc strategy.
Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) experimental results il-
lustrate that people are able to select strategies adaptively
in a stable environment. However, in a dynamic envi-
ronment in which the best strategy to solve an inference
problem changes, people do not always switch to the bet-
terperformingstrategy. Theseresultscanbeexplainedby
the SSL theory. First, the selection of the best-performing
strategy in the stable environment appeared to be the re-
sult of a continuous learning process, rather than of an
initial cost-beneﬁt trade-off process. In fact, the strategy
that predicted the most inferences at the end of the ex-
periment was not necessarily the strategy that predicted
more inferences at the beginning, as illustrated with the
compensatory environment.
The SSL theory also explains the lack of adaptivity:
When people develop a strong preference for a speciﬁc
strategy based on their experience, as, for instance, for
TTB in the noncompensatory environment, they will too
rarely select alternative strategies to be able to detect their
potentially superior performance. However, this does
not mean that they do not change their inferences at all.
When considering the proportion of inferences across the
different trial blocks it becomes clear that the participantsJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 271
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Figure 3: The proportion of choices predicted by TTB and WADD in the dynamic environment condition of the ﬁrst
experimental study of Bröder and Schiffer (2006), starting with the noncompensatory (A) or the compensatory (B)
environment. The environment was changed after the fourth trial block. Also shown is the SSL theory’s predicted
probability of selecting the two strategies. Only discriminating trials where the strategies make different predictions
are shown, and each trial block consists of 20 trials.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 272
did slowly change their inferences even when they had
developed a strong preference for one strategy.
3.2.3 Assuming a forgetting process during learning
The SSL theory predicts maladaptive behavior in a dy-
namic environment when a person has developed a strong
preference for a speciﬁc strategy. However, this maladap-
tive behavior was less pronounced than predicted by the
SSL theory (see Figure 3A). The theory predicts that an
adaptation to the new environment occurs only slowly. To
examine how much learning it would take before the the-
ory predicts that the better performing strategy WADD
is selected again, I simulated a hypothetical continuing
learning process beyond the actual observed 160 trials.
When using the estimated parameters it would take ap-
proximately 100 additional trials before the better per-
forming strategy WADD becomes most likely to be se-
lected (assuming an average payoff of −25 for TTB and
25 for WADD). This adaptation process appears too slow
in comparison to participants’ real adaptation.
How could a quicker adaptation process be accom-
plished? One peculiarity of the SSL theory consists in
assuming no forgetting during learning, unlike in many
learning models (e.g. Busemeyer, & Myung, 1992; Erev
& Barron, 2005; Rieskamp, 2006b; Rieskamp, Buse-
meyer, & Laine, 2003). According to the SSL theory, the
reinforcement a strategy received a long time ago has the
same effect as a recent reinforcement, which is psycho-
logically not very plausible. Moreover, without any for-
getting, adaptations in dynamic environments occur very
slowly. Thus, it appears reasonable to incorporate a for-
getting process in the SSL theory; accordingly Equation
3 can be changed to:
qt(i) = (1 − ϕ) · qt−1(i) + It−1(i)rt−1(i) (7)
with the forgetting parameter 0 ≤ ϕ ≤ 1. This extended
version of the SSL theory will predict a more dynamic
learning process than the original model, when the for-
getting parameter is below 1. For instance, a forgetting
parameter value of ϕ = .20 implies that a reinforce-
ment of 100 that was received 10 trials earlier will have
a present value of only 10 for a strategy’s expectancy, so
that only the present reinforcement will strongly affect
a strategy’s evaluation. Thus, incorporating a forgetting
process makes the SSL theory able to cope with dynamic
environments. However, it also makes the theory more
complex, which was the reason why the forgetting pro-
cess was not incorporated in the original speciﬁcation of
the SSL theory (see Rieskamp & Otto, 2006).
To examine whether the learning process in the study
by Bröder and Schiffer (2006) could be better described
by the extended SSL theory incorporating a forgetting
process, I estimated the parameters of the extended SSL
theory separately for each individual’s learning data as
described above. For the extended SSL theory four pa-
rameters were estimated, resulting in an average esti-
mated association parameter value of 16, an average ini-
tial preference parameter of βTTB = .59 for TTB, an appli-
cation error of .26, and ﬁnally an average forgetting rate
of ϕ = .07 (SD = .11). Thus, the standard parameters
were similar to those for the original SSL theory reported
above, withtheonlydifferencebeingalowervalueforthe
initial association parameter. The average forgetting rate
of .07 is relatively moderate, so that previous reinforce-
ments are not immediately forgotten but affect the selec-
tion process for some time; for instance, a reinforcement
of 100 will still have a present value of approximately 50
after 10 trials.
The extended SSL theory was able to describe the slow
adaptation process in the dynamic environments. Fig-
ure 4 shows the probability with which the theory pre-
dicts the selection of TTB and WADD. Especially when
examining Figure 4A, representing the condition where
participants faced the noncompensatory before the com-
pensatory environment, it becomes clear that by assum-
ing a forgetting process a more dynamic learning process
will be predicted, which describes the observed behav-
ior much better than the original SSL theory. Figure 4A
shows that by assuming a forgetting process the proba-
bility of selecting TTB decreases continuously when the
new environment is encountered, providing a good ac-
count of the observed slow adaptation process. Likewise
when considering Figure 4B, representing the condition
where participants faced the compensatory environment
ﬁrst, the extended SSL theory predicts a more dynamic
learning process.
Although the extended SSL theory described a more
dynamic learning process in line with the observed be-
havior it did not predict the choices with a larger prob-
ability. The extended SSL theory predicted participants’
choices with an average probability of .58, which is iden-
tical to the predicted probabilities of the original SSL the-
ory. To test which theory is more appropriate to describe
the observed inferences, I determined for each partici-
pant which theory had a better Akaike information cri-
terion (AIC; deﬁned as AIC = G2 + 2 × number of free
parameters of the model). The AIC takes a model’s com-
plexity into account by adding a penalty term to the ﬁt of
the model (for details see Burnham & Anderson, 1998).
For only 30 of the 120 participants did the extended SSL
theory assuming a forgetting process have a better AIC,
whereas for the remaining majority of 90 participants the
original SSL theory had a better AIC value (this result did
not differ substantially for the four conditions examined).
Thus, when taking the models’ complexity into account
the original SSL theory is the preferable model. Although
the extended SSL theory is able to account for a more dy-Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 273
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Figure 4: The proportion of choices predicted by TTB and WADD in the dynamic environment condition of the ﬁrst
experimental study of Bröder and Schiffer (2006), starting with the noncompensatory (A) or the compensatory (B)
environment. The environment was changed after the fourth trial block. Also shown is the predicted probability of
selecting the two strategies by the extended SSL theory incorporating a forgetting process. Only discriminating trials
where the strategies make different predictions are shown, and each trial block consists of 20 trials.Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 274
namic learning process, this does not allow the theory to
predict the inferences with a much higher probability.
4 General discussion
How do people select strategies for making inferences?
Does learning provide a fruitful basis for explaining how
strategies are selected and do people select successful
strategies even in dynamic environments? These main
questions of the article guide the discussion.
4.1 How strategies are selected
If people are equipped with a repertoire of strategies, how
do they decide which one to follow? The most prominent
answer in the literature to this question is to assume that
people trade off the costs and beneﬁts of a particular strat-
egy and select the one with the overall best evaluation.
Although this approach appears reasonable, the speciﬁcs
of the trade-off process have not been computationally
speciﬁed. This may be because different pathways have
been proposed for how the trade-off process could take
place. Payne et al. (1993) suggested that the trade-off
process could be based on a deliberate evaluation of the
anticipated costs and beneﬁts of the decision strategies
(pp. 92–99), yet they also argued that this process does
not necessarily need to take place deliberately and could
be based on learning (pp. 200–201). Both trade-off pro-
cesses appear intuitively appealing, but if they are both
responsible for the selection of strategies, it is necessary
to specify under which circumstances each process will
take place or how the two processes interact with each
other.
Dual-system theories of cognition provide an alterna-
tive explanation of how people select decision strategies
that is related to the cost-beneﬁt approach: People are
in either a “cognitive mode” in which the pros and cons
for selecting speciﬁc strategies are deliberately traded
against each other, or an “associative mode” in which
they do not think deliberately about the selection pro-
cess, but the selection is driven by a slow learning pro-
cess. Recently dual-system theories of cognition have
gained increasing attention, yet despite their popularity
they face the same problem as the cost-beneﬁt approach:
Namely, they are not sufﬁciently speciﬁed to allow pre-
cise predictions. To make these predictions it would be
necessary to specify when each cognitive system is ac-
tive or dominates the other, and how these two systems
operate. When the theories are computationally speciﬁed
it will be possible to test the different conceptualizations
of the dual-system theories rigorously against each other,
and against alternative “one-system” theories to evaluate
their advantages, a necessary test that has not yet been
accomplished.
I have followed a third path to explain how decision
strategies are selected, one that is based on learning. The
SSL theory assumes that people have initial preferences
for selecting speciﬁc strategies. It does not explain where
the initial expectancies come from, but they are most
likely the result of previous experiences with the strate-
gies or the results of an initial evaluation of the strate-
gies. However, more importantly, the initial preferences
are quickly changed through the success or failure of the
selectedstrategies. Thereforethestrategyapersonselects
aftergainingsomeexperiencewiththeinferencesituation
is basically determined by the performance of the strate-
gies being considered. For both studies that were reana-
lyzed for the present article, the SSL theory provided an
appropriate description of the selection process. There-
fore I would argue that the learning assumption is a very
fruitful perspective to follow when explaining how peo-
ple select strategies from their repertoire.
4.2 The importance of learning when inter-
preting people’s inferences
When analyzing participants’ inference strategies Newell
et al. (2003) restricted their main analysis to the end
of the experiment. They argued that at the beginning
of the experiment people would learn and explore the
structure of the environment. However, due to the large
search costs used in their experiment, when following the
cost-beneﬁt approach one would have expected the use
of information-frugal strategies right from the beginning.
Yet the reanalysis of their experiment illustrated that it
took some time before the participants converged on se-
lecting a speciﬁc strategy. When considering the results
shown in Figure 1 it becomes evident that the strategies
that do well in predicting participants’ inferences at the
end of the experiment do not predict the majority of in-
ferences at the beginning of the experiment. It appears
that learning is an important factor that needs to be taken
into account when interpreting inferences in a situation
in which outcome feedback is provided. Therefore the
conclusions regarding how people make their inferences
depend on the provided learning opportunity. Depend-
ing on whether the learning opportunities are sufﬁcient to
allow people to adapt to the speciﬁc environment, conclu-
sions might differ concerning whether people make their
inferences adaptively.
Theimportanceoflearningforinterpretingpeople’sin-
ferences also becomes obvious when considering the re-
analysis of Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) ﬁrst experiment.
In one experimental condition with a stable environment
the participants made altogether 160 inferences, without
any initial learning phase and with 20 fewer inferences
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ment. Bröder and Schiffer simply analyzed the data from
the onset of the experiment when classifying participants’
inference strategies. It is obvious that this classiﬁcation
was strongly inﬂuenced by the observed learning effects
represented in Figure 2. For instance, when looking at the
results for the compensatory environment represented in
Figure 2B, it becomes clear that the compensatory strat-
egy did best in predicting the inferences at the end of the
experiment, whereas at the beginning the compensatory
and noncompensatory strategies, on average, predicted
the inferences equally well. Bröder and Schiffer classi-
ﬁed their participants as using a speciﬁc strategy essen-
tially depending on which strategy predicted the majority
of choices. However, which strategy will predict the most
choices depends on learning. A person who initially se-
lects TTB in the compensatory environment might slowly
adapt to the environment by selecting a compensatory
strategy at the end of the experiment. However, this per-
son might still be classiﬁed as selecting TTB, because the
majority of choices are best predicted by TTB. Thus, for
this person the incorrect conclusion of not selecting an
adaptive strategy would be made.
The importance of learning is particularly crucial when
considering behavior in a dynamic environment. In
Bröder and Schiffer’s (2006) second experimental con-
dition the participants were only provided with 80 trials
before the environment was changed, after which another
80 inferences were made. If people adapt only slowly to
new environments, 80 trials might not be sufﬁcient for
adaptation to occur (see, for instance, the slow adaptation
process illustrated by Figure 3A). However, if the partic-
ipants had been given more learning opportunity, such as
the 120 trials in Newell et al.’s (2003) study, this might
have been sufﬁcient to induce them to switch to select-
ing an adaptive strategy. These examples illustrates that
as a result of experience, people change the strategy they
select for making their inferences. When testing whether
people select adaptive strategies it is necessary to provide
sufﬁcient learning opportunity.
4.3 The limitations of the SSL theory for
strategy selection
The SSL theory provides a fruitful account of how par-
ticipants select their inference strategies. For the study of
Newell et al. (2003) the theory was able to account for
how the predominant adaptive behavior at the end of the
experiment was the result of a learning process. Likewise
the SSL theory was able to describe the learning process
observed in the stable environments of Bröder and Schif-
fer’s (2006) ﬁrst experiment. Moreover, the theory could
explain why maladaptive behavior was observed in a dy-
namic environment: Maladaptive behavior occurs when a
decision maker develops a strong preference for a speciﬁc
strategy. As a consequence, alternative strategies are too
rarely selected to “discover” their potential performance
advantage after an environment change. Furthermore, ac-
cording to the SSL theory, reinforcement for a strategy is
accumulated over time, so it will take a while before a
better performing strategy can accumulate enough rein-
forcements to make its selection most likely.
Yet it became clear that the learning process predicted
by the SSL theory was too slow compared with the ob-
served learning process. To accommodate a faster learn-
ing process the SSL theory can be extended to include
a forgetting process, so that strategies’ expectancies de-
cline over time if they do not receive reinforcement. With
such a forgetting process a more dynamic learning pro-
cess occurs, implying a quicker adaptation to a new en-
vironment, as illustrated in Figure 4. However, the in-
creased complexity of the extended SSL theory incorpo-
ratingforgettingcouldnotbejustiﬁedwithasubstantially
higher ﬁt in comparison to the original SSL theory.
Another limitation of the SSL theory that became ob-
vious when reanalyzing the previous experimental results
is its inability to describe how people learn the validities
or importance of the different cues. Rakow, Newell, Fay-
ers, and Hersby (2005) showed that the importance par-
ticipants gave to different cues after learning often corre-
spondedbestwiththePearsoncorrelationofthecueswith
the criterion. However, they did not describe the process
by which the subjective importance is learned. Dieck-
mann and Todd (2004) examined several mechanisms for
how people could learn the rank order of cues. One suc-
cessful and relatively simple rule they studied calls for
memorizing a tally of correct and incorrect decisions a
cue has made. It would be interesting to incorporate such
learning mechanisms into the SSL theory to account for
cue-importance learning. However, this is a methodolog-
ically challenging enterprise because it requires disentan-
gling the process of learning cue importance from the
process of strategy selection learning.
Finally, it should be stressed that although the SSL
theory provides a good account of the observed learn-
ing process of the experimental studies examined here,
there are alternative approaches that do not rely on the as-
sumption of a strategy repertoire that could also explain
the observed behavior. Some promising contenders are,
among others, the connectionist approach (see, for exam-
ple, Gluck & Bower, 1988; Sieck & Yates, 2001), the
exemplar-based approach (e.g., Juslin, Jones, Olsson, &
Winman, 2003; Juslin & Persson, 2002), and the sequen-
tial sampling approach (e.g., Busemeyer & Townsend,
1993; Wallsten & Barton, 1982). In this article I did
not compare the different approaches with each other (for
such studies see Juslin, Karlsson, & Olsson, in press;
Persson & Rieskamp, 2007; Rieskamp, 2006a; Rieskamp
& Otto, 2006). For such a comparison it is necessary toJudgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 3, March 2008 Learning and inferences 276
design speciﬁc experiments in which the different models
lead to different predictions.
4.4 Final conclusions
The assumption that people are equipped with a reper-
toire of different inference strategies has been made in
many areas, but the question of how people select dif-
ferent strategies has not been satisfyingly answered. The
SSL theory posits that people select strategies on the ba-
sis of reinforcement learning. The accuracy of the theory
was illustrated by reanalyzing two previous experimen-
tal studies. Participants appeared to select their strate-
gies adaptively, such that strategies that performed well
weremorelikelytobeselected. Indynamicenvironments
the learning process was slow, so that maladaptive strate-
gies were selected. The SSL theory provides a compu-
tational description of how the strategy selection process
could take place. To reach adequate conclusions about
inference processes the importance of learning should be
taken into account.
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